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Regulation is a fact of life. It affects the food we eat, the safety 
of our workplace, the goods and services we buy and sell and 
the quality of our natural environment. It plays an important 
role in guarding New Zealanders from harm, protecting our 
rights, and ensuring that markets work fairly and efficiently. 
However, when regulation is badly designed or implemented 
it can fail to provide these protections, or place unnecessary 
burdens on personal freedoms and business efficiency. So is 
the New Zealand regulatory system as good as it should be, 
and how could it be improved? 
Regulatory 
Systems, 
Institutions  
and Practices
In 2013 the government asked the New 
Zealand Productivity Commission to 
develop guidance for improving the 
design of new regulatory regimes and 
recommend system-wide improvements 
to the operation of existing regimes. That 
report has recently been published1. The 
origin of the inquiry was concern about a 
number of high-profile regulatory failures, 
the proliferation and complexity of the 
regulatory system where solutions to 
failure add ever more layers of regulation, 
the fragmentation and lack of coherence 
across the whole regulatory system, and 
the difficulty of regulatory architects to 
judge, ex ante, the impact and effects of 
particular design settings. 
Steven Bailey	is	a	director	at	the	Productivity	Commission	and	led	the	commission’s	inquiry	into	
regulatory institutions and practices. Judy Kavanagh is a principal advisor at the New Zealand 
Productivity	Commission.
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The interest in regulation in New 
Zealand also stems from a number of 
important developments:
•	 Reforms	over	the	last	quarter	of	
the 20th century have changed how 
governments organise themselves, 
provide services and deliver policy. 
A range of decisions once taken 
centrally by a minister or within 
a public service department are 
now taken by state providers, 
private firms and individuals. But 
governments have retained (in some 
cases setting rules or standards 
through regulation) their ability to 
affect the quantity, quality, safety 
and distribution of services. These 
changes have made regulation a more 
visible and important government 
activity	(Yeung,	2010;	Majone,	1994).
•	 There	has	been	a	growing	awareness	
of the role that good-quality 
regulation and institutions can play 
in promoting economic growth 
(Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; Crafts, 
2006;	Conway	et	al.,	2006).
•	 Society	has	become	much	more	
diverse, with a broader range of 
attitudes to risk and expectations 
about what government can and 
should do.
•	 Individual	freedoms	and	human	
rights have taken on greater 
importance in New Zealand society, 
as signalled by the passing of the Bill 
of Rights Act in 1990 and the Human 
Rights Act in 1993.
new Zealand’s regulatory system
The ‘regulatory system’ is the institutions, 
principles and processes through which 
regulations are made, implemented, 
enforced and reviewed. It involves all 
three arms of government: the executive, 
Parliament and the judiciary. Together 
these shape the incentives faced by 
regulators and those regulated and their 
behaviour, and ultimately determine the 
success of regulation. 
New Zealand has a large and 
complex regulatory system, with as 
many as 200 different regimes, a large 
number of regulatory agencies, and 
more than 10,000 people employed in 
administering regulation. It is a major 
piece of government infrastructure, 
and is as significant as the tax and 
spending systems in terms of its impact 
on the lives of New Zealanders. Figure 
1 provides a stylised representation of 
the New Zealand regulatory system. The 
focus of our inquiry was on public sector 
organisations which have regulatory 
responsibilities.
What was our evidence? 
Our year-long inquiry covered much 
ground. We received 104 submissions 
from a wide range of interested parties. 
We also held over 100 engagement 
meetings with individuals and groups 
and surveyed 1,500 regulated businesses, 
surveyed 23 chief executives of regulatory 
institutions, and undertook 13 structured 
interviews with members of the boards 
of regulatory institutions and their 
departmental monitors. The commission 
was also able to make use of a large survey 
(over 15,000 respondents) undertaken 
for the Public Service Association (PSA) 
of their public sector union members by 
Victoria University of Wellington. Four 
hundred and forty respondents worked in 
regulatory roles, in either central or local 
government (300 and 140 respondents 
respectively). 
We undertook four case studies – 
the regulatory settings around financial 
markets, the provision of aged care, 
and the regulatory operations of the 
Environmental Protection Authority and 
the	Ministry	 for	Primary	 Industries	 –	 to	
achieve an in-depth understanding of the 
challenges of implementing particular 
regimes. We received reaction and 
feedback from inquiry participants to 
our draft findings and recommendations 
through release of a draft report.
Together the evidence gathered 
provided a rich picture of New Zealand’s 
regulatory landscape. We also reviewed 
18 official reports of major disasters in 
New Zealand and overseas – from leaky 
buildings to mining tragedies, to the mis-
selling of financial products. The failure of 
regulation was a central theme identified 
in all the reports.2 We were able to extract 
insights into the specific institutional and 
practice factors that contributed to the 
failure of regulation and what needed to 
be present and working well to be effective 
and achieve regulatory objectives.
Regulation proceeds 
through the 
Parliamentary process 
(for statutes) or the 
Executive Council (for 
Orders in Council)
Figure 1: The regulatory system
Cabinet considers 
proposed regulation 
(Cabinet papers and 
Regulatory Impact 
Statements)
A policy problem is 
identified and 
alternative policy 
responses evaluated 
by central government 
agencies
Regulatory agencies 
implement regulations 
with varying degrees of 
policy discretion 
(administer, monitor 
and enforce)
Courts settle 
disputes, interpret 
law and undertake 
judicial review
Central government 
agencies review the 
performance of 
regulatory regimes 
and agencies
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How did new Zealand’s regulatory system 
perform?
A number of strong themes emerged, 
which confirms that New Zealand’s 
regulatory system is not performing as 
well as it could be. 
Quality checks are under strain
New Zealand has a number of institutions 
and processes to test whether a new 
regulation is needed, its potential impact 
and whether it is well designed. However, 
many of these checks are under-resourced 
or are not having the impact they should. 
Parliament’s Regulations Review 
Committee, which reviews regulations 
and can recommend their cancellation, 
has seen its membership drop over the 
past 15 years and needs more staff. The 
committee meets for one hour per week, 
when the House is in session. It has little 
more than one dedicated policy researcher 
to support it and its membership has 
declined in recent years from eight to five 
MPs.	 It	 operates	with	 perfectly	 adequate	
guidelines and criteria for assessing the 
merits of new or existing regulation, but 
struggles to ensure that those guidelines 
are applied in practice. 
There have also been longstanding 
concerns about the quality of law-making 
in New Zealand. The Law Commission 
told the incoming minister of justice in 
2008 that legislative proposals receive 
inadequate scrutiny before they are 
introduced into Parliament, and that the 
mechanisms for scrutiny that do exist are 
fragmented. Of the 42 bills reviewed by 
the Law Commission in 2012, 20 did not 
comply with its guidelines, and the Law 
Commission told us that approximately 
half	 of	 the	 46	 bills	 they	 had	 reviewed	
in 2013 were ‘materially deficient’ 
(Legislation Advisory Committee, 2012). 
Moreover,	 the	 Law	 Commission	 has	
had to curtail its review activities, citing 
declining funding. The submission to our 
inquiry from Parliament’s legal drafters 
attributed much of the quality problem 
to the speed of the policy and legislative 
process.
There are also questions about the 
quality of regulatory policy analysis. 
Even	 after	 16	 years	 of	 experience,	 our	
process of regulatory impact analysis is 
not as robust as it could be. Analysis of 
the merits of regulatory interventions 
versus alternative policy responses is too 
often weak, as are the assessments of 
the efficiency and costs associated with 
regulation. External independent review 
of regulatory impact statements revealed 
that only a small proportion actually meet 
adequate quality standards for regulatory 
impact analysis (NZIER, 2010; Castalia, 
2012, 2013).
These essential quality checks need to 
be revitalised. Regulators cannot deliver 
better regulation than their legislative 
frameworks allow.
New Zealand regulation struggles to keep up 
with change …
Regulation in New Zealand can easily 
become obsolete and fail to keep up 
with technology or public expectations. 
Worryingly, almost two thirds of 
regulator chief executives surveyed by the 
commission reported that agencies often 
work with legislation that is outdated or 
not fit-for-purpose. As a result, regulators 
can be hamstrung, unable to respond to 
emerging problems or relying on ‘work 
arounds’ which can impose unnecessary 
costs on both the regulator and the 
regulated parties.
A key reason for this lack of flexibility 
is New Zealand’s heavy reliance on 
primary legislation (acts of Parliament). 
New Zealand appears to produce more 
laws than countries such as the United 
Kingdom, and puts more detailed 
material in statutes.3 This approach 
generates severe capacity constraints. 
Parliamentary time is scarce, which means 
that it can be hard to update legislation 
to meet changing circumstances or for 
fixing flaws.4	 Maritime	 New	 Zealand	
submitted to our inquiry that even the 
ability to make fundamental shifts in 
regulatory regimes is hampered by more 
urgent matters on the political and social 
landscape. Changes to existing regulatory 
regimes are generally only made in 
response to a significant event or crisis. 
And then, it is done in haste. 
In other countries legislatures delegate 
more rule-making powers, allowing faster 
responses to emerging issues. There is 
scope in New Zealand to delegate more 
rule-making powers, provided these 
powers are appropriately defined and 
controlled. This proviso highlights the 
difficulty in making changes to regulatory 
regimes to improve their effectiveness and 
performance. The critical elements of the 
regulatory system are self-reinforcing and 
display a level of interdependency. This 
means that a problem in one part of the 
system cannot be solved simply by making 
a single change. For example, delegating 
more regulation-making authority to 
regulators, especially where the rules are 
technical in nature, or allowing regulators 
to amend rules to improve workability 
would relieve the parliamentary 
bottleneck, but there is a reluctance to do 
so because of other features or weaknesses 
in New Zealand’s regulatory system. A 
number of submissions to the inquiry 
expressed the view that while delegating 
more to the Executive Council might be 
desirable, delegating regulation-making 
authority to regulatory Crown entities 
lacked the necessary checks and balances. 
The Parliamentary Counsel Office agreed 
that there is scope for greater delegation 
of authority to regulators, subject to 
controls, but it also noted risks, including 
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legislation ... appears to produce more 
laws than countries such as the united 
Kingdom, and puts more detailed 
material in statutes
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the proliferation of subordinate legislation 
as a result of poor regime design.
Weak feedback mechanisms can also 
hamper responsiveness to a changing 
regulatory environment. Several survey 
results provided perceptions about New 
Zealand regulators’ attentiveness to their 
performance, and their ability to learn 
from experience. Our survey of 1,500 
New Zealand businesses found that 
only 15% of businesses perceived that 
regulators ‘always’ or ‘mostly’ review their 
performance and seek opportunities to 
improve, although 48% thought that this 
happened ‘sometimes’. A second but more 
equivocal source of evidence came from 
our survey of 23 regulator chief executives. 
The chief executives were fairly evenly split 
on whether they agreed with the statement 
that ‘there are effective feedback loops 
between frontline regulatory staff and 
policy functions’, which is one important 
avenue for identifying opportunities to 
improve over time. Six respondents agreed 
or strongly agreed that there were effective 
feedback loops, but seven respondents 
disagreed or strongly disagreed (eight 
respondents neither agreed nor disagreed 
and two did not know).
The most detailed source of evidence 
came from the survey of PSA members. 
Respondents were asked how they 
perceive ‘their organisation’s ability to 
learn from their mistakes and successes’. 
There was general disagreement among 
PSA members that their organisations 
are good at learning from their mistakes 
and successes, but, notably, central 
government regulatory staff showed the 
highest level of disagreement. This was 
significantly different compared to the 
responses of regulatory staff working 
in local government and district health 
boards, and to the responses of non-
regulatory staff.
A resistance to sharing experiences and 
thus learning from mistakes and successes 
may be the result of negative experiences 
in the past, where raising issues has 
negatively affected the ‘success’ of a group. 
The	 Ministry	 of	 Business,	 Innovation	
and Employment submitted that the 
official response to issues or risks being 
raised has resulted in a cultural tendency 
to work around systemic issues rather 
than addressing them. They observed 
that this tendency was a key component 
of the regulatory failures that it (and its 
predecessor agencies) were responsible 
for. The ministry questioned whether 
barriers to raising issues and risks existed 
just within regulatory organisations or 
extended across the public service more 
generally; however, our inquiry found 
that the picture is not uniform. For 
example, a review of the New Zealand 
Customs Service undertaken in 2012 
noted positively its learning culture (SSC, 
Treasury	and	DPMC,	2012).	
The PSA survey reveals that few 
central government regulatory workers 
believe that the management systems in 
their organisations are flexible enough to 
allow them to respond quickly to changes 
or evolve rapidly in response to shifts in 
priorities. However, while the PSA survey 
presents a picture of inflexibility and a 
lack of speed among central government 
regulators in responding to changes in 
priorities, there is some evidence that 
regulators are attentive to and scan 
for changes in risks in the regulated 
environment. For example, the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand publishes a six-
monthly Financial Stability Report which 
includes a systemic risk assessment. The 
Ministry	for	Primary	Industries	monitors	
changes to New Zealand’s biosecurity 
risks.
Regime evaluation: taking a more systematic 
approach
New Zealand has a large and growing 
stock of regulation. On average, 100 
–150 acts and about 350 legislative 
instruments have been passed each year 
since the mid-1990s. Keeping the stock of 
regulation up to date is an important task 
of the government. This means ensuring 
that outcomes are still being achieved, 
unnecessary and inefficient rules are 
weeded out, and needed rules are adapted 
to new economic and social conditions. 
New Zealand does not have strong 
processes for reviewing its regulatory 
regimes and this has been recognised 
as a longstanding gap in New Zealand’s 
state sector arrangements for some time. 
New Zealand tends to have a ‘set and 
forget’ approach to its regulation and 
legislative frameworks. Although there 
have been improvements in regulatory 
management systems, departments still 
do not, in general, systematically apply 
basic good management principles 
and practices to the regulatory regimes 
that they administer (Offices of the 
Ministers	 of	 Finance	 and	 Regulatory	
Reform, 2013a, 2013b; Law Commission, 
2008). Government initiatives aimed at 
improving the review and evaluation of 
regulatory regimes have struggled to gain 
traction in the face of other priorities and 
limited follow-up from central agencies. 
Across a number of our inquiries we have 
found weak capability for, and limited 
attention to, evaluation. There is little to 
guide post-implementation review and 
determine what would actually constitute 
success, and whether a particular regime 
is achieving this. 
There needs to be a clearer strategy 
for managing the stock of regulation, 
with clear principles or targets to guide 
departments, and greater transparency 
from departments about how they will 
There needs to be a clearer strategy 
for managing the stock of regulation, 
with clear principles or targets to guide 
departments, and greater transparency 
from departments about how they will 
ensure that the regimes they administer 
are relevant, effective and necessary.
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ensure that the regimes they administer 
are relevant, effective and necessary.
More attention should be paid to improving 
regulatory skills …
Effective regulation depends on skilled and 
capable staff. As regulatory regimes have 
become more sophisticated, the demands 
on regulatory staff have risen. When we 
asked chief executives of New Zealand’s 
regulatory agencies about the capability 
of their workforce, around 20% thought 
that regulators faced significant skill gaps 
among their staff. The PSA survey and our 
survey of business give a different picture, 
with a more widespread perception 
of inadequacies in skills and training. 
Regulatory agencies face challenges in 
attracting, training and retaining key staff 
to meet these challenges. 
Delivering better and more consistent 
regulatory services will require a more 
professionalised workforce, with training 
and qualifications that recognise common 
skill sets and clearer career paths across 
agencies. Professionalisation involves 
creating a workforce where staff:
•	 possess	a	core	set	of	theoretical,	
practical and contextual knowledge;
•	 are	recognised	and	respected	by	
others in the profession and by 
the broader community for the 
knowledge they hold;
•	 have	opportunities	to	meet,	
network with and learn from others 
undertaking similar tasks;
•	 are	continually	challenged	to	stay	up	
to date with the latest developments 
in their field;
•	 share	a	world	view	about	the	role	
and purpose of their profession and 
are guided by a common code of 
professional conduct; and
•	 share	a	‘professional	language’	
and culture that instils a sense 
of ‘belonging to the regulatory 
profession’.
To meet the capability challenges 
facing regulatory agencies requires a 
purposeful, structured and integrated 
approach to professionalising New 
Zealand’s regulatory workforce. There 
are a number of initiatives already under 
way to promote a national framework 
of compliance qualifications and 
professional networks. For example, the 
New Zealand Qualifications Authority 
has approved the development of five 
new qualifications designed to support 
the capability development needs of 
regulatory staff in local and central 
government organisations. 
The Treasury and the State Services 
Commission need to provide greater 
support, to ensure that efforts to 
professionalise the workforce take root 
across the whole system.
… including at the very top of regulatory 
organisations
Much	 of	 New	 Zealand’s	 regulatory	
activity is carried out through Crown 
agencies, at arm’s length from ministers. 
Highly capable boards with the right 
mix of skills are important for the 
performance of these bodies, and of 
regulatory regimes. It is the responsibility 
of policy departments to identify 
suitable candidates for appointment to 
regulator boards. However, we found 
that departmental appointment processes 
were highly variable, including inadequate 
assessments of the skill needs of boards, 
poor planning, and patchy induction for 
new board members.
The Treasury and the State Services 
Commission play a significant role in 
appointments to departments and state-
owned enterprises. Departments should 
draw on this central experience and 
expertise in making appointments to 
regulator boards. Better-run appointment 
processes, which properly assess and 
fill skills gaps on boards, will deliver 
better candidates and better regulator 
performance.
High-quality leadership is also 
important for developing the cultures 
within agencies that support effective 
regulation, in particular the ability of 
agencies to learn from their earlier 
mistakes and successes. Some New 
Zealand regulators need to work harder at 
building these cultures. Evidence collected 
through this inquiry highlighted poor 
internal communication within some 
agencies, with workers feeling unable to 
challenge poor practices or not hearing 
a clear organisational mission from their 
senior managers. Previous restructuring 
of regulatory organisations has also been 
disruptive, with insufficient attention 
paid to the cultural impacts of change 
or the smooth operation of regulatory 
functions.
Monitoring of regulators is missing the mark
Crown agencies are subject to monitoring 
by an overseeing government department. 
Crown agencies also typically have an 
external board for governance purposes, 
and some have statutory independence 
from ministerial involvement in their 
regulatory functions. Under state sector 
legislation, the boards of regulators 
are accountable to ministers for their 
performance.
Our inquiry found a high level of 
dissatisfaction among regulator board 
members with the monitoring function. 
Few felt that the monitoring effort of 
the lead department was adding value 
either for the minister, who is the 
intended beneficiary of the monitor’s 
work, or to the Crown agency itself. 
This dissatisfaction is compounded by a 
considerable amount of role confusion 
with respect to ministers, monitors, board 
chairs and chief executives. Too often 
our inquiry found a high level of 
dissatisfaction among regulator board 
members ... [f]ew felt that the monitoring 
effort of the lead department was adding 
value either for the minister, ... or to the 
crown agency itself. 
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boards and their chairs are disempowered 
by the monitoring and ministers reach 
over boards to work directly with the 
chief executive of the agency concerned. 
A larger question is how well placed 
policy departments are to assess the 
effectiveness of a regulator’s practices 
and strategies: that is, whether they 
have chosen the best compliance tools 
and policies. The inquiry heard from a 
number of parties that the best judges of 
regulatory practice are other regulators. 
We found these arguments persuasive 
and recommended that a system of peer 
reviews be established, where panels 
of senior regulatory leaders – such as 
current and former chief executives – 
would examine and provide feedback 
to regulators on their strategies. These 
peer reviews would be embedded within 
the existing Performance Improvement 
Framework audits run by the State 
Services Commission.
The regulatory system needs clearer 
leadership, and a more active centre
The inquiry found weaknesses in the 
institutions responsible for oversight and 
management of the regulatory system. 
There is no overarching government 
strategy for regulation, no clear programme 
for its improvement, and no clear ‘owner’ 
of the system. When we look across New 
Zealand’s public policy machinery, we find 
a few well-run systems with clear, coherent 
and functional governance supported by 
strong policy capability. For example, our 
tax system is run and owned by the Inland 
Revenue Department. Treasury owns and 
is responsible for the fiscal system, while 
monetary policy is the responsibility 
of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. In 
each case the agencies concerned are clear 
about their role and are equipped to do 
the job. They are capable of thinking 
strategically about what they do, why they 
do it, how they judge success or failure 
and what they need to do to prepare for a 
different future. 
In contrast, no one has clear 
responsibility for our regulatory system. 
The regulatory system is large and 
distributed across several departments, 
agencies and ministerial portfolios. This 
devolved model generally makes sense. 
Individual departments and agencies have 
the knowledge needed to run specific 
regimes. But if the model is to work at 
its best there needs to be greater oversight 
and direction from the centre. Getting 
better performance from the regulatory 
system will require stronger leadership 
from ministers and central agencies, in 
particular the Treasury.
What was clear to us is that ministerial 
leadership of the regulatory system needs 
to be strengthened. The responsibilities 
of the minister responsible for regulatory 
management could be clarified and 
expanded to include:
•	 defining	the	overall	objective	of	
the system and bringing focus and 
attention to it;
•	 strategic	prioritisation	of	effort	
across the system;
•	 specifying	and	allocating	tasks	for	
improving the system; and
•	 promoting	continuous	improvement	
in regulatory design and practice.
This needs to be properly designed 
and resourced, with appropriate political, 
institutional, managerial and intellectual 
support. Our inquiry report makes 
recommendations on how to achieve this.
A learning and adaptive regulatory system 
Black (2014) describes the regulatory task 
as follows:
Regulation is a problem-based 
activity: ‘society’ in some form 
decides there is a problem, or that 
there is a risk of a problem in the 
future, and policy makers and 
regulators devise ways to address 
that problem. But how we identify 
something as a problem is contingent 
on what we value (and therefore 
what we think is under threat), and 
how we analyse problems and create 
solutions for them is contingent on 
our knowledge and understanding 
of the world and our ideas of how it 
operates. (p.9)
Designing and implementing 
regulation, therefore, is extremely difficult. 
It is fraught with complexity, severe 
knowledge gaps, unintended consequences, 
speculation about the efficacy of different 
regulatory arrangements, and a regulatory 
environment which is in a state of constant 
change. 
Given this reality, we cannot afford 
to have a regulatory system that is poorly 
equipped to respond to implementation 
challenges, changes in the regulatory 
environment, or other performance issues. 
Yet it appears that institutional constraints 
within our regulatory system have rendered 
it virtually incapable of gradual evolution 
and incremental change. How can we 
develop a ‘learning’ regulatory system – 
one where regulatory regimes can adapt 
to meet future challenges without a major 
event like a regulatory failure or crisis as 
the catalyst for necessary change? How 
can we create regulatory regimes that are 
flexible and adaptive so that they don’t 
suffer from a slower but more insidious 
fate, with regulators and regulated parties 
doing ‘work arounds’ to get around 
outmoded or outdated requirements or 
design flaws?
A poorly-performing regulatory system 
is a significant drag on new Zealand’s 
economy and society; there are 
heightened risks of regulatory failure; 
and, ultimately, there is a risk that 
society’s trust in the integrity of the 
new Zealand regulatory system will be 
severely compromised.
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Streeck and Thelen (2005) suggest 
that we need to start by recognising 
and accepting the gap between design 
and practical implementation. An 
acknowledgement that regulation can 
never be designed with perfect foresight 
of the consequences allows us to accept 
that ambiguity is inherent and the ability 
to change must be built into regulatory 
regimes. It implies that we can place less 
emphasis on designing regulation (and 
the desirability of locking the details 
into primary legislation) and put more 
emphasis on monitoring, evaluation and 
feedback processes that identify priorities 
for readjustment. Rule designers and 
implementers can then see themselves in 
an ongoing/cyclic relationship that has 
as its goal effective regulation. The ‘set 
and forget’ tendency of regime designers 
would be replaced by more ownership 
of and responsibility for the continuous 
improvement of regulatory regimes. 
This does not require modification 
to the structure of the regulatory 
system, but rather the adoption of a 
systems approach to how the regulatory 
system	 is	 managed.	 Much	 of	 the	 focus	
of regulatory management in New 
Zealand, and in other parts of the world, 
has focused at the front end, on the 
quality of regulation-making. A systems 
approach to regulatory management 
would see monitoring and review of 
regimes not as the end of a process – or 
worse, forgotten about entirely – but as 
a fundamental part of enhancing the 
quality and impact of the regulatory 
system. As Streeck and Thelen observe, 
the lessons from hindsight are perhaps 
more important for design than foresight. 
Regime review needs to have a strong link 
with, and input into, the ongoing design 
process. In many cases, however, we have 
found that these processes are not well 
integrated. Regulatory management is 
often fragmented and concerned with the 
constituent parts of the system – regime 
design, implementation and review 
individually – and not on how these 
parts work together and reinforce the 
system. A systems approach to regulatory 
management recognises that making a 
change in one part of the system may 
require changes to other parts to be 
made.
The inquiry’s recommendations for 
improvement in New Zealand’s regulatory 
system might appear daunting. However, 
the challenges are vastly outweighed by 
the costs of not making the effort. The 
stakes are high. A poorly-performing 
regulatory system is a significant drag 
on New Zealand’s economy and society; 
there are heightened risks of regulatory 
failure; and, ultimately, there is a risk that 
society’s trust in the integrity of the New 
Zealand regulatory system will be severely 
compromised.
1	 While	this	article	draws	on	the	Productivity	Commission’s	
inquiry into regulatory institutions and practices in New 
Zealand, the opinions expressed are those of the individual 
authors.
2 This research was inspired by and built on the work of 
Professor	Julia	Black	presented	in	her	Sir	Frank	Holmes	
Memorial Lecture at Victoria University in April 2014 (Black, 
2014). 
3 As a comparison, between 2009 and 2014 New Zealand 
created	almost	four	times	more	statutes	than	the	UK.
4 New Zealand has a small Parliament (120 members) and a 
relatively short electoral term (three years); Parliament’s rules 
of procedure require the House of Representatives to sit in 
total on about 90 days a year.
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